Consider an industry composed of N firms producing a homogeneous good. Firm i produces the good in quantity qi 2 0.
Its cost function is Ci(qi), defined for all qi 2 0. The inverse demand function for the good is p(Q), where Q=2qi is the total industry output.
Assume that:
A.1 There exists a E E (0, A.2 p(Q) is twice continuously differentiable and p' (Q) 0 for
A.3 Ci(qi) is twice continuously differentiable and, for any
A.4 For all Q E [0, E) and i = 1,...,N, there exists some a < 0 (possibly dependent on Q and i) such that
For any cost function satisfying A.3 and A.4, define the extended function, Fi(xi), as follows:
Moreover, since F (xi) = C (0) for xi < 0 and A.4 
Then Cournot equilibria must satisfy:
and
It is straightforward to verify that there exists at least one solution to (1) But this violates the implicit function theorem at that point. It follows that condition (1) has a unique solution for all
Now since qi(Z) is a continuous function of Z, so is
We also know that
There must therefore exist a ZE which solves Q(ZE) = ZE and the corresponding q(ZE), i = 1,...,N, constitutes a solution to (1) and (2).
We now provide a condition for the solution of (1) and (2) to be unique: 
where M(Q') = {ijgi(QE) > 0, there exists exactly one solution to
(1) and (2).
Proof: Let qi(Z)~ and qi(Z)* denote the left-hand and right-hand derivatives of qi(Z). The initial step of the proof is to establish that:
Since xi(Z) is unique for all Z E [0, t) and given A.4, we can again invoke the implicit function theorem to show that xi(Z) has a continuous derivative for Z e [0, E) and it is given by:
Thus ( 
It follows that if (only if)
we have Q'(ZE)* < 1 ( 1), there must be only one ZE (= QE) and hence only one q?(Z!), i = 1,...,N.
But:
iEM(ZE) iEM(ZE) Ci(q 1 (ZE)) -pl (ZE)
and the condition stated in the theorem follows directly. 1 .
Since any Cournot equilibrium must satisfy Assumption A.5 is frequently involved in discussions of existence of Cournot equilibrium (see in particular Novshek, 1985 and Shapiro, 1988) . Given that p' (Q) <_ 0 by A.2, it in fact is equivalent to the Novshek assumption that p' (Q)
However, this assumption is unnecessarily strong for existence of equilibrium, given A.1 through A.4. For, any solution to (1) and (2) is a Cournot equilibrium if and only if qj yields a global maximum of p(qi+ QEi)qi -Ci(qi), where QEi = QE -qi and i = 1,...,N. As long as this condition holds at some solution to (1) and (2), existence of a Cournot equilibrium is assured. It is unnecessary for existence of Cournot equilibrium to assume that this condition holds at every solution to (1) and (2). Moreover, at the designated solution to (1) and (2), it is unnecessary that qi be globally optimal in response to every aggregate output of the firms, but merely to QEi. Finally, it is unnecessary that each firm's profit function be pseudoconcave, much less everywhiere strictly concave.
The uniqueness condition (3) is the same as that derived by Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) (equation (16) , Corollary 3.1, p. 687) and by Kolstad (1988) (equation (5), Theorem 2, p. 4).
The approach taken here is however much simpler and the proof much Our approach is closest to that of Szidarovszky and Yakowitz (1977) . They use it to show the existence of a unique El and Q(Z) -Z = 0 for all Z = ZE, and the method of interval bisection (see for example Conrad and Clark, 1987, p. 40 ) would in such a case rapidly converge to the unique solution to (1) and (2).
2.
Not every solution to (1) and (2) need be a Cournot equilibrium.
Although (1) and (2) insure that each firm selects a point in reply to the outputs of the other firms which satisfies the necessary conditions for a local maximum of its profit function, this need not be a local best reply, much less a global best reply, for every firm.
